Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial: Theory and Practice Kitap Alıntıları – Milan Vego

Since ancient times, straits have been used by a weaker side to transport troops or to prevent transport of the enemy’s troops. They have also been used for evacuation of one’s troops and civilians.

In some cases, a weaker power at sea might close an international strait and prevent the enemy’s military/commercial movement. The objective is then to cause economic damage and dislocation.

One side in a war at sea might be unable to employ surface forces in the theater of main effort because of its decision to make one of the sea’s exits impassable to both commercial vessels and warship

In an enclosed sea, the most effective method of neutralizing enemy submarines is to blockade the sea’s sole exit or exits in the case of a semi-enclosed sea.

The main methods in denying control of a choke point are:
Preventing the enemy’s naval movements.
Preventing the enemy’s movement of military/commercial shipping.
Support of the army in defending a choke point.
Ensuring safety of transport of friendly troops.
Preventing transport of the enemy’s troops.

Defense of naval bases/ports is one of the prerequisites to employment of one’s naval forces to obtain or dispute control of the sea. Protracted defense of even a small naval base might require commitment of much larger forces, and perhaps even more important, a lot of time

A superior side on land would often use its army and air forces to capture important maritime positions and thereby greatly enhance the opportunities for naval forces to contest control of the sea

Sometimes a weaker side has to defend a major bay/gulf because of its critical importance as a naval training area

In practice, most of the major landings conducted by a stronger side have been successful. One of major reasons for this has been great superiority at sea and in the air

Coastal defense forces are intended to provide initial defense of the beaches against enemy surprise seaborne/airborne landings, terrorist attacks, and commando raids. They are usually numerically small

Defense against enemy commando raids and terrorist acts against ships, bases/ports and coastal facilities/installations is a critically important part of seaward defense. Ideally, it should be organized and rehearsed already in peacetime

Mine defense or mine counter-measures (MCM) aims to: prevent the enemy from laying mines in the operating areas of one’s naval forces or transit routes of commercial shipping, and in coastal waters; cause enemy mines to detonate without inflicting losses on one’s naval vessels or commercial ships; remove
enemy mines for subsequent deactivation and/or destruction; divert one’s ships to use routes free of enemy mines; and permanently or temporarily alter the characteristics of one’s ships to reduce the danger from influence mines. MCM
requires a disproportionately larger and more consistent effort, in terms of number of ships, materiel, personnel, and organization, than mining

Mines are used extensively as a part of defenses against large-scale enemy amphibious landings

Mines were extensively used for protecting the approaches to one’s naval bases/ports and basing areas

The safety of one’s coastal shipping is considerably enhanced by obtaining at least local and temporary control of the air in the seaward defense zone

In combat, the principal responsibilities of the local sea defense forces are as
follows:
Anti-submarine defense.
Anti-combat craft defense.
Air defense.
Defense and protection of coastal sea traffic
Defensive mining.
Mine defense (mine counter-measures).
Commando raids defense.
Defense against terrorist acts.

In defense of the coast, the attacker enjoys many advantages over the defender. He usually has the initiative and can choose the place and time of attack. The morale factor is always on the side of the attacker. The defender is prone to take counsel of his fears, and to imagine every possible, instead of only reasonable, forms of attack.

The navy’s basing/deployment area must be made secure. Strong defenses on the coast can deter or prevent the stronger fleet from attacking the coastal flank of one’s ground forces

For Mahan, every proposal to use a navy as an instrument of pure passive defense is found faulty upon particular examination; and these various results all proceed from the one fundamental fact that the distinguishing feature of
naval force is mobility, while that of a passive defense is immobility

Most naval classical thinkers focused on the role of the navies in the struggle for sea control. They also paid great attention to projecting naval powers ashore

Defense of the coast is a broad term referring to direct or indirect defense and protection of one’s coastal area (a part of the littoral bordering with the coastline), offshore islands/archipelagoes, and adjacent waters from the enemy’s
attack across the sea and from the air

Because of its inferiority, defense of the coast for a weaker
side is much more critical but also more difficult than for a stronger side

Defense of the coast is conducted by both weaker and stronger sides at sea. It is an integral part of sea denial. However, disputing control of the sea is conducted from one’s coast and out to a certain distance seaward

Because of the new technological advances, the opportunities of a weaker side to inflict significant damage on the enemy coast are much greater today than they were in the past. The stronger side must be put under increased pressure so that it is forced to commit ever larger forces in defense of the coast

A weaker side has often resorted to bombardments of military and civilian facilities/installations on the enemy coast

A weaker side has often used unconventional platforms to attack enemy warships and merchant vessels singly or in groups at their bases/ports and various facilities/installations. They were conducted by using primitive submersibles, midget submarines, one- or two-manned torpedoes, fast torpedo boats, and
explosive boats. Such forces were specially selected and highly trained.

The main objectives in conducting attack on the enemy’s coast are destruction/neutralization of enemy surface ships/submarines and merchant vessels singly or in groups at their bases/ports, naval/military facilities/installations, civilian infrastructure, and important military-economic centers deep into the enemy’s territory. The ultimate objectives of these actions are to force a stronger side to commit larger forces in defense of a vulnerable part of its coast and thereby disperse its available naval strength.

Attack on the enemy coast is also one of the methods of active fleet-in-being. In operational terms, attack on the enemy
coast by a stronger side is an integral part of exercising (or exploiting) sea control, while for a weaker side such attacks are part of disputing control of the sea. A weaker side would generally face considerable difficulties in carrying out diverse attacks on a strongly defended enemy coast

The best results are achieved by using diverse forces – the navy plus the forces of other services – in attacking enemy maritime trade. This is especially important in the enclosed and semi-enclosed sea theaters where not only large ships, submarines, and land-based fixed-wing aircraft, but also light forces,
armed helicopters, midget submarines, “smart” mines, coastal missile/gun batteries, and unmanned aerial/surface/subsurface vehicles (UAVs/USVs/UUVs) can be effectively used. Additionally, the army can assist the navy by capturing important positions, ports, and ship-related faculties/installations

In attacking enemy maritime trade, the focus should be on those elements that will generate a ripple (or cascading) effect on the entire maritime transportation system. Hence, the bottlenecks of enemy maritime trade should be identifie early on, preferably in peacetime. One of the most effective ways to attack enemy maritime trade is to destroy or inflict heavy damage on the enemy’s ship repair facilities. Enemy ships that cannot be repaired are out of service, and the effect is the same as if they were sunk. This effect-based thinking could be of major help in properly identifying the key nodes and links of enemy maritime
trade and thereby preparing and executing sound operation plans

Attacks on the enemy’s maritime trade should be spread over a relatively large sea/ocean area so that the enemy is not given an opportunity to recover or react quickly.

Attacks against the enemy’s maritime trade should be conducted systematically and against selected elements of the enemy’s maritime trade. Whenever possible, these attacks should be carried out with multi-service forces. Attacks on selected elements of enemy maritime trade should be conducted continuously; otherwise, the results will be found wanting

A blockaded country often resorts to commercial counter-blockade.The objective is then to inflict losses as large as possible on the maritime trade of a stronger sea power. In contrast to a commercial blockade by a stronger side, a
commercial counter-blockade is not combined with a naval blockade. A weaker fleet is usually not very effective in crippling an enemy’s commerce to the degree to which a blockade has ruined its own maritime trade. Nevertheless, such a fleet is always a potential menace whenever the superior force allows it to be uncovered and free to move. Commerce raiding is usually an integral part of commercial counter-blockade.

Theoretically, commerce raiding could be conducted by either a weaker or stronger side at sea. Yet, in practice commerce raiding is the logical course of action for a weaker fleet.

The principal objective of commerce raiding was destruction of the enemy commerce not naval vessels

Originally, commerce raiding was based on small and fast frigates and schooners. They would attack only enemy merchant ships but avoid encounters with men-of- war

Admiral Castex noted that chief among minor counter-attacks
are guerre de course directed against the enemy’s communications, which, as we explained above, is likely to pay high return in terms of manoeuvre

Sir Julian S. Corbett wrote that interference with enemy trade is not only a means of exerting secondary economic pressure but is also a primary means toward overthrowing the enemy’s power of resistance

Admiral Mahan wrote The harassment and distress caused a country by serious interference with the commerce will be conceded by all. It is doubtless a most important secondary
operation of naval war, and it is not likely to be abandoned till war itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a most dangerous delusion, when presented in rather fascinating garb of cheapness to the representatives of a people. Especially it is misleading when the nation against whom it is to be directed, possesses, as Great Britain did and is one of two
requisites of a strong sea-power: a widespread healthy commerce and a powerful navy.

Commerce raiding does not aim to economically ruin the stronger side, but to inflict as much damage as possible on its maritime trade. It succeeds even when conducted on a very small-scale by pushing up marine insurance rates and freight costs. It also might lead the enemy to abandon some of its economic activity. This, in turn, allows the non-belligerents to pick up trade, thereby injuring the enemy’s long-term trade prospects.

Privateering was formally abolished by the Declaration of Paris signed by all major European powers on April 16, 1856. However, the United States, Spain and Mexico refused to ratify the Declaration of Paris because their navies were small. Hence, they wanted privateering to remain legal

To protect their commerce, the British used patrolling by light naval vessels, and convoying. Merchant ships were assembled according to their destination in ports designated in advance.

Privateering was aimed at bringing the anarchy of retaliation under the rule of law. A privateer was a merchant vessel converted into a commissioned vessel capable of capturing small prizes

Privateering was used both by the weaker and the stronger fleet, while commerce raiding was generally used by the weaker fleet. Although similar in many ways, there is also a great difference between privateering and commerce raiding. Privateering was conducted by privately owned ships and for profit. In contrast, commerce raiding was organized and conducted by the navies.
Common to both methods is that attacks on enemy merchant shipping are conducted sporadically.

The main methods used in the past by a weaker side at sea for destroying enemy shipping at sea were:
Privateering (historic).
Commerce raiding.
Commercial counter-blockade.
Offensive mining

The Germans differentiated the following types of war on enemy trade at sea: (1) cruiser warfare (Kreuzerkrieg); (2) U-boat
warfare; and (3) mine warfare. War on the enemy sea trade would be aimed at damaging the enemy’s shipping; control of neutrals; disputing trade frontiers; blockade of the enemy coast; preventing enemy fishing; and destruction of the enemy’s bases, radio stations, and undersea cables

It was a part of the general struggle of the nation and conducted by a general strategy. The objective of the war on economy was protection and advancement of one’s own and paralyzing the enemy’s sources of strength. Economic sources of strength include the economy in general and war industries, plus economic relations with other countries. The components of economic war were foreign policy, economy, finances, propaganda, armed forces (Wehrmacht), and sabotage. The economic war consisted of production war, trade war, and finance war.

The aim was to ravage the enemy’s economy and instill in the enemy merchant classes despair of pursuing hostilities to their financial ruin.

Success in the attack on the enemy maritime trade will be considerably enhanced by having sound theory, doctrine, training, and operational command organization/C2. Sound theory for maritime trade warfare should already have been developed in peacetime; otherwise, it is not possible to develop a sound doctrine. The very heart of such a doctrine should be operational or tactical concepts for attack on the enemy’s, and defense and protection of one’s own, maritime trade.

In theory, an attack on the enemy maritime trade should end in a complete destruction of the enemy’s maritime trade. Yet this is rarely achieved in practice.

The principal methods of combat employment in the conduct of maritime trade warfare are major and minor tactical actions at sea surface, subsurface, in the air, and ashore

In generic terms, the principal objective in an attack on enemy maritime trade is to destroy or neutralize the enemy’s ability to use its military and commercial shipping and ship-related
industries ashore in support of the war effort. A collateral
objective of an attack on maritime trade is to inflict hardship on the enemy population by depriving it of food, fuel and other commercial goods and thereby to weaken or even seriously undermine the enemy population’s morale and support for war

A variety of terms is used in referring to destruction of the enemy’s military-economic potential at sea, such as “commerce warfare,” “attack on merchant shipping,” and “attack on the sea lines of communication (SLOCs)” (or anti-SLOC).

Counter-containment should never be used alone or in isolation, but it forms part of a collection of methods for disputing control of the sea. It is also inherently not only the navy’s but a joint forces’ responsibility

Naval forces can generate strategic effect by tying large enemy forces up on the land front. If a substantial diversion should be created, then the focus of one’s efforts must be made in an area where the enemy cannot afford to fail

Another method of counter-containment is to use one’s naval strength to tie up considerable enemy forces on land or to use superior strength on land to tie a stronger side’s naval forces to a theater of secondary effort. Strong positions supporting comparatively weak naval forces may have a similar effect on a flee trying to establish at a distance from its home base.

Strategic diversion could be planned to reduce enemy pressure in home waters. This can be accomplished by diverting stronger enemy forces from exerting too strong a pressure on one’s forces in home waters, or to reduce significantly the presence of the stronger fleet in one’s main theater of effort

The principal purpose of a strategic diversion could be as follows:
Achieve a more favorable ratio of forces in one’s main theater.
Reduce enemy pressure in home waters.
Reduce enemy pressure on the land front.
Pose a threat in another theater.
Disperse the enemy’s available naval strength.
Reduce enemy economic pressure

Generically, military diversion is aimed at drawing the enemy’s attention and/or forces from the main to a secondary area of interest. In terms of scale of the objective, tactical, operational, and strategic diversion can be differentiated.

Diversion and concentration of one’s forces have diametrically
opposite purposes. Concentration aims to mass one’s forces against the enemy’s forces with the objective of eliminating the remainder of the enemy force and possibly attaining force superiority.

In general, strategic diversion is used to reduce unbearable military, political or moral conditions. Regardless of its purpose, however, the methods of conducting a strategic diversion are essentially the same: weaken the pressure at one’s own
vulnerable place by applying pressure at the vulnerable or sensitive place of the enemy.

A weaker side might use its surface forces only in challenging the blockade of a stronger sea power. The objective then would be usually to gradually weaken the blockading forces and thereby enhance the chances of other forces, primarily submarines, breaking through the blockade

Forcing a strongly defended strait using surface ships is difficult if not impossible, if effective air cover is not provided. The chances are generally greater in forcing a wide and lightly defended passage.

Most of these choke points were also the key positions for a
stronger side to establish and maintain a distant naval/commercial blockade

In the modern era, the efforts of one’s naval forces to lift a blockade cannot be successful without the participation of friendly ground troops and air forces. A stronger side would not be forced to lift a blockade unless it was suffering considerable losses at sea. Theoretically, this could be achieved by winning a decisive naval battle (in the past) or a major fleet-versus-fleet operation

The principal methods in countering an enemy naval blockade are:
Lifting the enemy naval blockade.
Breaking through the blockading line.
Forcing a defended choke point.
Weakening the enemy’s blockading forces

A weaker but relatively strong side would normally resort to counter-containment in the face of the containment of its forces by a stronger side. These efforts would be carried out for the duration of the hostilities. Counter-containment cannot be
successful unless combined with offensive actions aimed at inflicting large losses on the stronger enemy.

Diverse types of mines should be used to complicate the enemy’s efforts to neutralize their threat. Mining should be conducted by using surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. Diversity of platforms greatly complicates the task of enemy intelligence in accurately and promptly identifying the mine threat

Deception should be used whenever possible to mislead the enemy about the time and extent of mining efforts. Then the enemy might not be able to counter the mine threat effectively and/or in a timely manner, because of the lack of sufficient
MCM forces deployed in the mined area. One’s naval capabilities are not infinite. Hence, land-based aircraft and helicopters should also be employed in one’s mining effort.

Offensive mining should be conducted covertly. Covertness can be greatly enhanced by laying mines at night, in poor visibility, and in bad weather. However, sometimes gross lack of operations security might have highly adverse consequences for a side that laid mines in enemy waters

A weaker but relatively strong side should lay mines in multiple theaters. The objective should be not only to inflict losses but also tie and put stress on the enemy MCM forces.

Mines should be laid over a wide area, thereby putting the maximum burden on the enemy’s mine defenses. However, this should not be carried to an extreme. One must balance properly the need to limit the enemy’s movements and inflict large losses on his forces with avoiding excessively mining a certain area and thereby unduly limiting the movement of friendly forces or even endangering the safety of one’s own shipping